N.C. Business Court Opinions, April 23, 2025 – May 6, 2025
By: Rachel Brinson
Yoder v. Verm, 2025 NCBC 22 (N.C. Super. Ct. May 6, 2025) (Brown, J.)
Key Terms: summary judgment; settlement agreement; 12(c) motion; collateral estoppel; breach of contract
As summarized here, this action arose from Defendants’ purported breaches of a Settlement Agreement resolving previous litigation between the parties. At issue here is Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment on his claim for breach of the settlement agreement due to Defendants’ alleged failure to pay Plaintiff 36% of the appraised value of the real property at issue per the terms of the Settlement Agreement. Relying on and being bound by the Court’s previous determination as a matter of law at the 12(c) stage regarding the proper interpretation of the relevant provision of the Settlement Agreement, the Court determined that there were no material issues of fact relating to the deadlines imposed by the Settlement Agreement and that summary judgment in Plaintiff’s favor was appropriate. The Court rejected Defendants’ attempts to relitigate matters previous ruled on by the Court in its order and opinion on the 12(c) motion.
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Jones v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletics Ass’n, 2025 NCBC Order 25 (N.C. Super. Ct. April 25, 2025) (Houston, J.)
Key Terms: preliminary injunction; NCAA; college football; athletic eligibility; NIL deal; redshirt; antitrust; Chapter 75; restraint of trade; rule of reason; procompetitive effects; UNC; Duke
Plaintiffs, two college football players who have exhausted their years of athletic eligibility under the NCAA’s eligibility Bylaws, brought suit seeking 1) a declaration that the NCAA’s enforcement of the Bylaws violated North Carolina’s antitrust laws under Chapter 75; and 2) preliminary and permanent injunctive relief preventing enforcement of the Bylaws. Here, the Court addressed Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction.
The Court denied the motion. First, Plaintiffs failed to show a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits of their claims. Under the three-step rule of reason test governing antitrust compliance, although Plaintiff had arguably shown that the Bylaws were commercial in nature and thus could be governed by Chapter 75, they failed to show that the challenged Bylaws were an unreasonable restraint on trade, particularly given the NCAA’s substantial evidence of procompetitive effects, or that legitimate competitive benefits could have been achieved by less restrictive means. In addition, Plaintiffs failed to make a sufficient evidentiary showing that the NCAA arbitrarily enforced the Bylaws. Second, Plaintiffs failed to show a likelihood of irreparable harm absent an injunction as they had known about the Bylaws their entire careers but delayed seeking injunctive relief until now. Moreover, the potential loss of NIL deals could be remedied by monetary damages. Finally, the balance of the equities weighed against injunctive relief. A preliminary injunction would upset the status quo by suspending the Bylaws otherwise applicable to the Plaintiffs who presently have exhausted their eligibility, and would, to some extent, prematurely determine the ultimate relief sought.
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Smith v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletics Ass’n, 2025 NCBC Order 26 (N.C. Super. Ct. April 25, 2025) (Houston, J.)
Key Terms: preliminary injunction; NCAA; college football; athletic eligibility; redshirt; antitrust; Chapter 75; restraint of trade; rule of reason; procompetitive effects; Duke
Raising substantially the same claims and arguments as in Jones v. National Collegiate Athletics Association (summarized above), Plaintiffs here sought a preliminary injunction preventing enforcement of the NCAA eligibility bylaws. The Court denied Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction on the same grounds as in Jones.
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DT Lulana Gardens LLC v. SDCK I LLC, 2025 NCBC Order 27 (N.C. Super. Ct. April 29, 2025) (Robinson, C.J.)
Key Terms: designation; N.C.G.S. § 7A-45.4(a)(2); securities; sale of collateral; UCC; security interest
This action arose out of a dispute between the parties related to a failed purchase of a secured promissory note and the alleged pledge of membership interests as collateral. Defendant timely filed a notice of designation, asserting that designation was proper under N.C.G.S. § 7A-45.4(a)(2)—disputes involving securities.
The Court concluded that the action did not meet the criteria for designation as a mandatory complex business case pursuant to the designation statute. Based on the complaint’s allegations, the case appeared to be a straightforward case involving a security interest under the Uniform Commercial Code and a potential breach of contract. At best, Defendant’s conclusory statement in its notice of designation showed a tangential relationship with securities, which was insufficient to warrant designation.
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Suazo v. Suazo, 2025 NCBC Order 28 (N.C. Super. Ct. May 6, 2025) (Robinson, C.J.)
Key Terms: opposition to designation; equitable distribution; N.C.G.S. § 7A-45.4(a)(1); N.C.G.S. § 7A-45.4(a)(8); amount in controversy; breach of fiduciary duty; misappropriation of trade secrets
This action arose out of a dispute between Plaintiff Gregory Suazo and Defendant Crystal Suazo regarding their jointly owned company, Reagan Madison Inc. Plaintiffs asserted various claims against Ms. Suazo and others, including claims for misappropriation of trade secrets and breach of fiduciary duty. Defendants timely filed a notice of designation under N.C.G.S. § 7A-45.4(a)(1) (claims involving the law governing corporations) and § 7A-45.4(a)(8) (disputes involving trade secrets). Plaintiffs opposed designation arguing that the case was “a divorce case with a business twist” and that the amount in controversy was less than $5 million and therefore didn’t meet the Business Court’s amount in controversy threshold.
The Court rejected both arguments. First, while the District Court has exclusive jurisdiction over all equitable distribution claims, that does not preclude the Business Court from exercising its authority to hear actions involving a material issue set forth in N.C.G.S. § 7A-45.4(a). Here, Plaintiffs claims for breach of fiduciary duty and misappropriation of trade secrets satisfied the requirements for designation under subsections (a)(1) and (a)(8), respectively. Second, the $5 million threshold referenced by Plaintiffs only applies to cases that must be designated to the Business Court under N.C.G.S. § 7A-45.4(b), i.e., “mandatory mandatory cases.” For a case to be designated under N.C.G.S. § 7A-45.4(a), the amount in controversy need only meet the requirement for a case to be in Superior Court—in excess of $25,000. Accordingly, the Court overruled Plaintiffs’ objection to designation.
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The information in this article is not, nor is it intended to be, legal advice. You should consult an attorney for advice regarding your individual situation.