N.C. Business Court Opinions, February 25, 2026 – March 10, 2026
By: Austin Webber
Lucas v. Hopper, 2026 NCBC 16 (N.C. Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 2026) (Davis, J.)
Key Terms: summary judgment; unjust enrichment; proper parties
As previously summarized here, this case involves a dispute regarding the business relationship between Andrew Lucas and Harold Hopper. The Court previously granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant on Plaintiff’s claims premised on either a partnership or joint venture theory; however, the Court denied summary judgment on Plaintiff’s unjust enrichment claim and requested additional briefing on the issue of which of the individuals/entities in the suit should be parties to the unjust enrichment claim.
The Court concluded that A. Lucas was the only proper plaintiff as he was the party performing services for the benefit of Defendants; his company, SDB Partners, functioned merely as a conduit for payments. With respect to the defendants, Plaintiff argued that all three Defendants were proper because 1) L. Hopper owned LH Service and received all profits therefrom, and 2) H. Hopper indirectly benefited through his filing of a joint tax return with L. Hopper. The Court disagreed and concluded that LH Service was the only proper defendant because A. Lucas’s work was performed in furtherance of LH Service’s contracts with the Eden Facility and thus any benefit provided was to LH Service itself.
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Watts Guerra LLC v. Series 1 of Oxford Inx. Co. NC LLC, 2026 NCBC 17 (N.C. Super. Ct. Mar. 3, 2026) (Earp, J.)
Key Terms: motion to dismiss; Rule 12(b)(6); insurance policy; declaratory judgment; breach of contract; bad faith; NC Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practice Act; ejusdem generis; repudiation; excusal
Plaintiff Watts Guerra LLC purchased reinsured insurance policies related to a mass tort lawsuit (the “Policies”) from Defendant Series 1 of Oxford Insurance NC LLC. On multiple occasions, representatives or agents of Defendant or its parent stated they would not pay any claim for the Policies due to the potential sale of Defendant’s parent. Plaintiff filed multiple claims with Defendant under the Policies and, in response, Defendant requested Plaintiff provide certain information as required by the Policies, which Plaintiff refused to do. After the claims were not paid, Plaintiff brought suit. Defendant moved to dismiss all claims under Rule 12(b)(6).
Breach of Contract. Defendant argued that its indemnification obligations were not triggered because Plaintiff failed to satisfy the condition precedent of delivering the requested information. In response, Plaintiff asserted that it did not need to provide the information because Defendant had breached the contract by anticipatory repudiation. The Court held the Complaint did not sufficiently plead repudiation because (1) only the statements of the parties are attributable to a repudiation claims; (2) Defendant’s statement it would not pay the claim in full was not an unequivocal refusal to comply; and (3) Plaintiff’s submission of a second claim and allegation that it continued to engage with Defendant in good faith after the alleged repudiation, and Defendant’s second request for information showed that neither party treated Defendant’s statements and conduct as a repudiation. With respect to the information requests, Plaintiff argued that the principle of ejusdem generis applied, and that the general words of “all other information requested by Oxford” should be limited to the specifically requested documents in the Policies. The Court did not apply the principle of ejusdem generis in interpreting the Policies because such interpretation is contrary to the canons of contract construction, would create surplusage, and such a limited interpretation would undermine Defendant’s other rights under the Policies. Because the Policies required Plaintiff to provide certain information before filing suit and Plaintiff failed to do so, the Court granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss the breach of contract claim.
Bad Faith. Plaintiff argued Defendant committed bad faith by engaging in strategies to delay handling Plaintiff’s claim to make Defendant’s financial condition more appealing to potential buyers. The Court denied Defendant’s motion to dismiss because Plaintiff adequately alleged that on multiple occasions Defendant or its agents urged Plaintiff to delay submitting its claims and threatened it would not fund such claims while Defendant attempted to procure a buyer.
UTDPA. Plaintiff argued that a UTDPA claim alleging isolated instances of conduct was permissible. Defendant argued that a UTDPA claim was not permissible because the Captive Insurance Act excludes Defendant from regulation under Chapter 58. The Court held that N.C.G.S. 58-63-15(11) did not apply because such section does not create a private cause of action and the alleged violations do not indicate a general business practice; however, the Court noted under chapter 75, violations of some of N.C.G.S. § 58-63-15(11) may support a private cause of action. The Court denied Defendant’s motion to dismiss because Plaintiff sufficiently alleged claims under chapter 75.
Declaratory Judgment. Plaintiff’s request for declaratory judgments relating to Defendant’s alleged bad faith conduct and unfair and deceptive trade practices were sufficiently pleaded to survive dismissal. However, the Court dismissed the claim to the extent it related to Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim for the same reasons the breach of contract claim was dismissed.
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Jekson USA, Inc. v. White, 2026 NCBC 18 (N.C. Super. Ct. Mar. 4, 2026) (Davis, J.)
Key Terms: motion to dismiss; breach of contract, non-compete; non-solicit; misappropriation of trade secrets; unfair and deceptive trade practices; conversion
Plaintiff initiated this lawsuit against its former employee, alleging that Defendant had misappropriated its trade secrets, including a proprietary high throughput bullet loading tray (the “Tray”), and formed a competing business in violation of the non-compete and confidentiality provisions of his employment agreement. Defendant moved to dismiss all claims.
Breach of Contract. Defendant first argued that the non-compete and confidentiality provisions were without consideration as he signed the employment agreement 14 days after he began working for Plaintiff. The Court rejected this argument as it was unclear at this stage whether the terms were agreed to at the time Defendant began working. Further, a confidentiality agreement does not require additional consideration if it does not constitute a restraint of trade. Second, Defendant argued the non-compete expired when the 3-year term of his employment agreement expired; however, the Court noted Defendant’s employment would have become at-will and the terms of the non-compete continued for 1 year after termination. Third, Defendant argued the non-compete only applied if Plaintiff terminated Defendant’s employment. The Court held such language was ambiguous and that its interpretation was a question of fact. Fourth, Defendant argues the complaint failed to allege how Defendant breached the employment agreement; however, the Court found Plaintiff sufficiently alleged that, inter alia, Defendant hired a former employee of Plaintiff, solicited customers and suppliers, and used Plaintiff’s confidential information. For the foregoing reasons, the Court denied Defendant’s motion to dismiss for breach of contract.
Misappropriation of Trade Secrets. Defendant argued that this claim failed because the complaint did not 1) identify the trade secrets with adequate specificity; or 2) adequately allege acts of misappropriation. The Court disagreed. Plaintiff adequately identified the Tray and other information to be trade secrets and alleged various efforts to maintain their secrecy. Further, Plaintiff’s allegations that, among other things, Defendant claimed Plaintiff’s proprietary designs were his own, made and kept a 3D physical rendering of the Tray, and formed a new entity to compete with Plaintiff while still employed with Plaintiff were sufficient to allege misappropriation. Accordingly, the Court denied Defendant’s motion to dismiss the UDTPA claim.
Conversion. Defendant argued that because Plaintiff never demanded the return of its property, he could not be liable for conversion. But demand is only required where a defendant lawfully comes into possession of the converted property. Because Plaintiff alleged that Defendant took and retained the Tray without permission, demand and refusal were not necessary. Thus, the Court denied Defendant’s motion to dismiss the conversion claim.
Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices. Because Plaintiff’s predicate claims for misappropriation of trade secrets and conversion survived, the UDTPA claim survived as well.
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Londry v. Stream Realty Partners, L.P., 2026 NCBC 19 (N.C. Super. Ct. Mar. 9, 2026) (Earp, J.)
Key Terms: motion to reconsider; N.C. R. Civ. P. 54(b); breach of partnership agreement; breach of fiduciary duties; N.C. R. Civ. P. Rule 60(a)
As summarized here, the Court previously denied Defendants’ summary judgment motion for Plaintiff’s breach of partnership agreement and breach of fiduciary duty claims, in part because Defendants had not presented the partnership agreement at issue. Defendants moved for reconsideration and, for the first time, submitted the partnership agreement to the Court. The Court declined to consider the agreement since the Defendants could have presented it at the summary judgment stage. Nevertheless, the Court, under Rules 54(b) and 60(a), concluded that its previous order warranted reconsideration because it had placed the burden on the wrong party. Because Defendants had presented substantial evidence that Plaintiff was not a partner in Stream Charlotte, the burden should have shifted to Plaintiff to present evidence showing a genuine issue of material fact existed. Because Plaintiff failed to show that Defendant Farrar, by himself, had authority to transfer a partnership interest to Plaintiff and that the partnership existed, Plaintiff failed to meet this burden. Accordingly, the Court granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty claims.
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Gamba v. Balcerzak, 2026 NCBC Order 20 (N.C. Super. Ct. Feb. 26, 2026) (Robinson, C.J.)
Key Terms: order on designation; N.C.G.S. § 7A-45.4(a)(2); North Carolina Securities Act; N.C.G.S. § 78A; amended complaint; untimely
On January 14, 2025, Plaintiff served Defendant Gradient Investments, LLC the original complaint which alleged, inter alia, violations of Chapter 78A – the North Carolina Securities Act. Plaintiff later filed an amended complaint, which was deemed filed on December 15, 2025. Defendant Gradient filed the notice of designation on February 17, 2026 – over 1 year after the filing of the original complaint – seeking designation under N.C.G.S. § 7A-45.4(a)(2) stating the amended complaint alleges activities regulated by Chapter 78A. Although the Court agreed that subsection (a)(2) was implicated in the case, the Court determined that designation was improper because it was untimely. Both the original complaint and the amended complaint alleged violations of Chapter 78A; thus, the notice of designation should have been filed within 30 days of service of the original complaint.
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Powers v. E. Radiologists, Inc., 2026 NCBC Order 21 (N.C. Super. Ct. Feb. 26, 2026) (Houston, J.)
Key Terms: class action; attorneys’ fees; Rule 53; referee; special master
This case involves a putative data breach class action against Defendant. After the Court entered a preliminary approval of settlement in the amount of $3,200,000, Plaintiffs filed a motion for attorneys’ fees in the amount of $1,500,000, plus other out-of-pocket expenses and awards. The fee motion contained an initial declaration from one of Plaintiffs’ attorneys but lacked specific hourly rates, descriptions of the particular work performed by each attorney or time involved, or any other non-conclusory evidence. Rather, the fees amount was based upon one-third of the purported value of the settlement. The Court requested specific additional evidence to support the requested fees. Plaintiff’s counsel then submitted 15 declarations from the Plaintiffs’ attorneys; but again, they lacked the requisite itemization of the fees and costs or sufficient evidence that the hourly rates were consistent with standard market rates. The Court deferred ruling on the motion, and, with the consent of Plaintiff’s counsel, appointed a referee, at the expense of Plaintiff’s counsel, to evaluate the motion and provide a report to the Court.
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Assurance Grp., LLC v. Shackelford, 2026 NCBC Order 22 (N.C. Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 2026) (Davis, J.)
Key Terms: Letter of Rogatory; subpoena; production
Upon Plaintiff’s request, and the representations that all parties consent and Plaintiff’s counsel will comply with the laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, the Court requested appropriate judicial authorities issue a subpoena to compel the production of documents of a Massachusetts business.
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Davis v. HCA Healthcare, Inc., 2026 NCBC Order 23 (N.C. Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 2026) (Davis, J.)
Key Terms: Rule 54(b); motions to reconsider; N.C.G.S. § 131E-97.3; competitive healthcare information; trade secrets; Public Records Act; Article I, Section 18 of the North Carolina Constitution; N.C.G.S. § 7A-109
This putative class action lawsuit was brought by a number of NC residents alleging that Defendants have violated Chapter 75 by engaging in anticompetitive acts regarding the provision of inpatient and outpatient services in western North Carolina. Defendants moved for summary judgment, contending that none of the anticompetitive terms alleged in the complaint were actually contained in their managed care contracts with commercial health insurance providers. In conjunction with the summary judgment motion, the parties filed numerous documents provisionally under seal and requested that the Court allow them to remain under permanent seal because they constituted “competitive health care information” under N.C.G.S. §§ 131E-97.3 and -99 and thus were exempted from disclosure under the Public Records Act. In a previous decision, the Court, relying on Frye Regional Medical Center, Inc. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of North Carolina, Inc. 2020 NCBC Lexis 53 (N.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 17, 2020), disagreed that much of the information was protected but deferred ruling on the motions to seal to allow the parties to limit the number of documents sought to be sealed or propose redactions. Certain Defendants moved to reconsider and argued that the Court’s reliance on the Frye decision was in error because Frye failed to recognize that the Court of Appeals case on which it primarily relied had been superseded when the Legislature amended N.C.G.S. § 131E-97.3 to include a broad definition of “competitive health care information.” The Court agreed and vacated its previous order on the motions to seal and considered them anew.
Defendants argued that the motions to seal should be granted in full because 1) each and every word in the supporting documents were “competitive health care information” under the statute, and 2) at least some of the information in the documents related to proprietary trade secrets. The Court rejected the first argument as some of the information Defendants sought to seal was generalized, had little to no competitive value, was publicly available, or did not relate to competitive health care activities as such phrase was now defined under N.C.G.S. § 131E-97.3. Further, some documents and information had become stale over time. Finally, the requested relief was not narrowly tailored to protect the public’s qualified right of access to court records. As to Defendants’ second argument, the Court noted that some of the documents may contain trade secrets; however, the documents were not in-and-of-themselves trade secrets in their entirety as some information was publicly ascertainable or had no independent economic value. Accordingly, the Court directed the parties to confer to limit the number of documents for which sealing was sought, and the specific portions of those documents for which sealing was appropriate.
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Assurance Grp., LLC v. Shackelford, 2026 NCBC Order 24 (N.C. Super. Ct. Mar. 3, 2026) (Davis, J.)
Key Terms: motion for leave; futile; de facto fiduciary duty; familial relationship
Plaintiff is an insurance marketing organization that sells insurance-related products. Defendants were former agents of Plaintiff, who allegedly conspired to poach Plaintiff’s employees and clients and misappropriate Plaintiff’s confidential information. Plaintiff moved to amend its complaint, seeking to add, among other things, a breach of fiduciary duty claim against Defendant D. Shackelford.
Plaintiff argued that a fiduciary duty existed because D. Shackelford was an officer of Plaintiff and because of his close familial relationship with Plaintiff’s president (his uncle). However, at the hearing, Plaintiff’s counsel largely abandoned the argument that D. Shackelford was an officer due to Plaintiff having not included him in its list of officers in its answers to interrogatories. Regarding the familial relationship, the Court held that Plaintiff’s allegations were mere conclusory assertions not supported by any special circumstance giving rise to a fiduciary relationship since mere familial relationship are not sufficient to a fiduciary relationship. Accordingly, the Court denied the addition of the breach of fiduciary duty claim as futile.
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S&R Comput. Assocs., Inc. v. Hampel, 2026, 2026 NCBC Order 25 (N.C. Super. Ct. Mar. 4, 2026) (Houston, J.)
Key Terms: preliminary injunction; non-compete; non-solicit; reasonableness; geographical area; irreparable harm; blue pencil rule
Plaintiff, a computer support company, filed this action alleging, inter alia, that its former employees had breached the non-competition and non-solicitation provisions in their employment contracts. Plaintiff sought a preliminary injunction enjoining Defendants from breaching the contracts.
The Court concluded that Plaintiff had failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits for its claims for breach of the non-competes or non-solicits. The non-competes appeared overbroad because no evidence was submitted to justify the scope of the geographical area restriction and they prohibited future work distinct from the duties Defendants performed for Plaintiff. The non-solicits appeared unreasonable because they lacked limiting parameters, such as being limited to clients who had a relationship with the parties during Defendants’ employment. The Court also concluded that Plaintiff had failed to show a likelihood of irreparable harm because no evidence was submitted that Defendants performed services for a former client of Plaintiff and Plaintiff waited several months before bringing the preliminary injunction motion. The Court declined to apply the blue-pencil rule to rewrite the overbroad provisions. Accordingly, the Court denied Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction.
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TIG Ins. Co. v. Fleming, 2026 NCBC Order 26 (N.C. Super. Ct. Mar. 5, 2026) (Robinson, C.J.)
Key Terms: mandatory complex business case; N.C.G.S. 7A-45.4(a) and (b); order on designation; and reverse piercing the corporate veil; non-competition; non-solicitation; trade secrets; confidential information
This case involves an attempt by Plaintiff to enforce a judgment of over $20,000,000 against Defendant P. Fleming and related entities where Plaintiff contends P. Fleming has shielded his assets by having them owned in the name of various entities over which he exercises complete domination and control. Plaintiff filed a notice of designation, asserting that designation was proper under N.C.G.S § 7A-45.4(a)(1)—disputes arising under Chapters 55 and 57D. According to Plaintiff, these Chapter were implicated because the Court would need to determine the true owners of certain entities and whether corporate entities should be disregarded under a theory of reverse veil piercing. The Court held that a claim for reverse veil piercing alone is insufficient under N.C.G.S. 7A-45.4(a) for designation. Because designation under N.C.G.S. 7A-45.4(a) failed, designation under N.C.G.S. 7A-45.4(b) must also fail because satisfying the requirements under N.C.G.S. 7A-45.4(a) is a prerequisite. Thus, the Court determined that designation was improper.
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Mary Annette, LLC v. Crider, 2026 NCBC Order 27 (N.C. Super. Ct. Mar. 9, 2026) (Robinson, C.J.)
Key Terms: notice of designation; motion to intervene; derivative claim; N.C.G.S. § 7A-45.4(a)(1); N.C.G.S. § 7A-45.4(a)(9); N.C.G.S. 7A-45.4(d)(2); N.C.G.S. § 57D-8-01
Plaintiff Mountain Girl Ventures, LLC (MGV) brought derivative claims on behalf of Mary Annette, LLC against Defendants for breach of contract and specific performance. Mary Annette, LLC, through its own counsel, filed a motion to intervene and timely filed a notice of designation under N.C.G.S. § 7A-45.4(a)(1). MGV filed an objection to the NOD. The Court determined that designation was proper because filing the NOD with the motion to intervene was appropriate under N.C.G.S. 7A-45.4(d)(2), a derivate claim implicates Chapter 57D, and MGV’s contention the NOD was improper under N.C.G.S. § 7A-45.4(a)(9) was irrelevant as Mary Annette solely sought designation under N.C.G.S. § 7A-45.4(a)(1).
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