N.C. Business Court Opinions, April 22, 2026 – May 5, 2026
By: Austin Webber
PJC Mgmt. Grp., LLC v. MAACO Franchisor SPV LLC, 2026 NCBC 37 (N.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 22, 2026) (Conrad, J.)
Key Terms: franchise agreement; Rule 12(b)(6); breach of contract; implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; joint liability; guaranty; declaratory judgment; unfair and deceptive trade practices; aggravating circumstances; accounting
Plaintiffs are franchisees of Defendant MAACO Franchisor SPV LLC. Defendants Driven Brands Inc. and Driven System LLC, MAACO’s direct and indirect parent companies, guaranteed MAACO’s obligations under the franchise agreements. Under the franchise agreements, franchisees must pay weekly fees to MAACO, which it is supposed to use for marketing. Plaintiffs brought the present lawsuit asserting various claims arising from MAACO’s alleged misuse of the weekly fees for purposes unrelated to marketing.
Breach of Contract, Breach of the Implied Covenant, Declaratory Judgment. MAACO conceded the contracts were valid, but argued that Plaintiffs had not sufficiently alleged breach because their allegations were based on conclusory, unreasonable inference and alleged only upon information and belief. The Court disagreed and denied the motion as to MAACO. Plaintiffs’ allegations that MACCO significantly reduced expenditures on ads, refused to provide contractually required accounting of advertising-related receipts and disbursements, and incorrectly assessed charges to Plaintiffs, were sufficient to allege breach under North Carolina’s notice pleading standards. Further, because MAACO did not independently address the claims for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing or for declaratory judgment, such claims also survived. However, the Court dismissed the claims as to the parent companies because Plaintiffs did not allege that the parent companies had actually breached their guaranties.
UDTPA. The Court dismissed the UDTPA claim because Plaintiffs did not allege the aggravating circumstances necessary to support a UDTPA claim based on breach of contract.
Accounting. Because an accounting request is a claim for relief, not an independent cause of action, the Court granted the motion to dismiss the accounting cause of action, without prejudice to Plaintiffs’ right to later seek an accounting as a remedy.
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Lucas v. Hopper, 2026 NCBC 38 (N.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 23, 2026) (Davis, J.)
Key Terms: Rule 54(b) certification; interlocutory order; final judgment; immediate appeal; summary judgment
As summarized here, the Court previously granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on all claims except for Plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment claim, which it deferred ruling on pending supplemental briefing. Plaintiffs subsequently moved the Court to certify the order for immediate appeal under Rule 54(b) and to stay any proceedings regarding the unjust enrichment claim. Defendants did not oppose the requested relief.
Because the claims were legally intertwined, arose from the same facts and circumstances, and could lead to inconsistent verdicts on the same undisputed facts, the Court granted the motion and amended the order to certify it as a final judgment subject to immediate appeal.
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Lucas v. Hopper, 2026 NCBC 39 (N.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 23, 2026) (Davis, J.)
Key Terms: Rule 54(b) certification; interlocutory order; final judgment; immediate appeal; unjust enrichment; summary judgment
As summarized here, the Court previously granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on all claims except for Plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment claim. After supplemental briefing on the issue of who the appropriate parties should be for the unjust enrichment claim, the Court then entered a second order, summarized here, dismissing the unjust enrichment claim against all Defendants except LH Service, Inc. Plaintiffs subsequently moved the Court to certify the second order for immediate appeal under Rule 54(b) and to stay the remaining unjust enrichment claim against LH Service, Inc. Defendants did not oppose the requested relief.
Because the claims were legally intertwined, arose from the same facts and circumstances, and could lead to inconsistent verdicts on the same undisputed facts, the Court granted the motion and amended the second order to certify it as a final judgment subject to immediate appeal.
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Auto Provisions, LLC v. G1.34 Holdings, LLC, 2026 NCBC 40 (N.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 23, 2026) (Robinson, C.J.)
Key Terms: summary judgment; Rule 56; breach of fiduciary duty; breach of contract; unjust enrichment; implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; buy-sell event; condition precedent
This dispute arose between members of Recon Partners, LLC (Recon), Plaintiff Auto Provisions, LLC (AP) the 60% owner, and Defendant G1.34 Holdings, LLC (G1) the 40% owner, regarding their contractual obligations. Initially, the parties entered into a framework document that contemplated a loan, which was the basis of the operating agreement (OA). Under the OA, G1 was to remit payments to Recon for the development of a software product. However, after a software developer invoice was submitted, G1 refused to remit payment believing it was outside the scope of G1’s responsibility. AP then notified G1 that G1 had materially breached the OA, triggering a buy-sell event. AP and Recon filed a complaint and G1 filed its answer with counterclaims. Both parties moved for summary judgment.
Breach of Fiduciary Duty Against AP. The Court granted AP’s motion for summary judgment because AP, as the majority member, did not exercise a level of control over Recon that could give rise to a fiduciary duty to G1. G1’s consent was necessary for various company actions and AP’s sole unilateral authority was to appoint and remove managers. Further, the Court noted the manager of Recon was AP’s principal, not AP itself.
Breach of Contract Against Recon. G1 argued Recon materially breached the OA by failing to provide quarterly financials, failing to provide material contracts to G1 for review, and by failing to repay the loaned amounts under the initial framework document. As to the quarterly financials, because there was evidence that Recon’s manager failed to timely deliver a single quarterly financial statement, the Court denied Recon’s motion in part to determine if such breach was material, but otherwise granted Recon’s motion with respect to all other financial statements. The Court also granted Recon’s motion regarding the submission of the material contracts as no evidence was submitted that any material contracts were entered into without G1’s review. As to the loan repayments, the Court granted Recon’s summary judgment motion because earning $10,000 in client revenue – which had not yet occurred – was a condition precedent for triggering the loan repayments.
Unjust Enrichment Against Recon and AP. Having determined that the operating agreement was valid and governed the repayment of the financial contributions at issue, the Court granted Plaintiffs’ motion on the unjust enrichment claim.
Breach of Contract Against AP. G1 argued that AP failed to deliver the 9% equity interest in Recon upon G1 delivering the software. Because the $10,000 in client revenue condition precedent has not been satisfied, the Court granted AP’s motion.
Breach of Implied Duties of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Against Recon and AP. Because the breach of implied duty of good faith and fair dealing claims were based on the same conduct as the parts of Defendant’s breach of contract claims which the Court determined should be dismissed, the implied duty claims were dismissed as well.
Declaratory Judgment. G1 sought declaratory judgment that (i) Recon breached the OA and “loan agreement,” (ii) no valid buy-sell event occurred and G1 is not required to sell its equity, (iii) AP and Recon have an obligation to repay the “loan,” and (iv) the software had been delivered as a viable product. Recon sought summary judgment as to (i) and (iii) above, and AP sought summary judgment as to all four requested declarations. Except for the claim of breach of contract for timely providing the financial statements, the Court granted Recon’s motion as all other claims had been dismissed. The Court also granted AP’s motion, except as to the buy-sell event, for which the Court determined that a genuine issue of material fact existed.
Breach of Contract (Specific Performance), Declaratory Judgment, and Indemnification Against G1. AP and Recon sought declaratory judgment that (i) G1 materially breached the OA by not paying certain expenses related to the software development, (ii) AP and Recon satisfied all conditions necessary for the buy-sell provision, (iii) G1 must sell its equity in Recon pursuant to the buy-sell provision, and (iv) G1 must accept a promissory note from AP in exchange for the software development expenses G1 paid on behalf of Recon. Plaintiffs also sought indemnification for their costs and expenses caused by G1’s alleged breaches. Because the Court found a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether G1’s failure to pay the expenses was a material breach of the OA, and such breach was a prerequisite to determining the other issues, the Court denied Plaintiffs’ motions for summary judgment on these claims.
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Spring v. Lawson, 2026 NCBC 41 (N.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 27, 2026) (Houston, J.)
Key Terms: Rule 12(b)(6); conversion; trespass to chattels; LLC; fiduciary duties; misappropriation of trade secrets; unfair or deceptive trade practices; in or affecting commerce
This dispute arose out of joint company, Defendant Monster Demolition, LLC, formed by Plaintiff Spring and Defendant Lawson. After disagreements arose between the individuals, Spring filed suit against Defendants. Defendants filed counterclaims arising from Spring’s alleged failure to keep adequate books and use of Monster’s property for his personal use. Spring moved to dismiss the counterclaims under Rule 12(b)(6).
Conversion and Trespass to Chattels. The Court dismissed these counterclaims to the extent they were brought on behalf of Lawson because there were no allegations that Lawson himself owned the equipment at issue. The Court otherwise denied the motion because Monster had sufficiently pleaded that it owned the equipment and that Spring had unlawfully dispossessed Monster of such equipment.
Breach of Fiduciary Duty. Because the events allegedly constituting breach of fiduciary duties occurred after the parties agreed Spring was only a “nominal member” without ownership interest and Defendants did not otherwise plead facts supporting the existence of a fiduciary duty, the Court granted Spring’s motion to dismiss this counterclaim.
Misappropriation of Trade Secrets. Defendants alleged that Spring misappropriated the expertise and business relationships Lawson contributed to Monster. The Court dismissed this counterclaim because Defendants did not plead any non-conclusory, factual allegations suggesting that (i) the information derived any independent commercial value from not being generally known or readily ascertainable, or (ii) they took any actions to maintain the information’s secrecy.
Unfair or Deceptive Trade Practices. The Court dismissed this counterclaim to the extent it was brought on behalf of Lawson because Defendants failed to plead facts suggesting any unfair or deceptive conduct by Spring against Lawson. As to Monster, the Court denied the motion because Monster’s allegations that Spring had formed a competing company, diverted Monster’s assets and clients to the competing company and others, and knowingly did so with intent to harm Monster were sufficient to allege unfair conduct in or affecting commerce at this stage.
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Brier Creek Owners Ass’n v. Brier Creek Country Club Owners Ass’n, 2026 NCBC 42 (N.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 27, 2026) (Houston, J.)
Key Terms: Rule 12(b)(6); motion to dismiss; counterclaims; declaration; homeowners association; injunctive relief; unjust enrichment; breach of fiduciary duty; unfair and deceptive trade practices; fireworks
Plaintiff, the owners’ association for the Brier Creek community in Raleigh, NC, moved to dismiss certain counterclaims of Defendant, a sub-association representing the property owners of a portion of Brier Creek. Defendant alleged that Plaintiff incorrectly calculated assessments to be paid by Defendant pursuant to the governing declaration and asserted counterclaims for, inter alia, preliminary injunction, unjust enrichment, breach of fiduciary duty, and unfair and deceptive trade practices, which Plaintiff moved to dismiss. Pursuant to BCRs 7.4 and 7.6, the Court considered the motion uncontested and decided it without a hearing as Defendant failed to file a response to the motion.
Injunctive Relief. Recognizing that injunctive relief is a remedy not an independent cause of action, the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion to dismiss Defendant’s “claim” for injunctive relief.
Unjust Enrichment. Considering only the allegations of the counterclaims on a motion to dismiss, the Court found that Defendant failed to sufficiently allege facts to support its unjust enrichment claim under Rule 8’s notice pleading standards and dismissed the claim without prejudice. Specifically, the Court found Defendant’s allegations to be conclusory, alleging only that it was required to pay Plaintiff certain expenses related to a fireworks show, not that it actually made any such payments or conferred other benefits on Plaintiff. Defendant also failed to specify the amount of any payments allegedly made to Plaintiff or what such payments were for.
Breach of Fiduciary Duty. The Court determined that Defendant’s conclusory assertions that Plaintiff owed a fiduciary duty to Defendant were insufficient and lacked factual support to infer the existence of a fiduciary relationship between the parties. Additionally, Defendant’s allegations relating to the alleged breach of a fiduciary duty were rather allegations of a breach of contract. Accordingly, the Court dismissed the breach of fiduciary duty claim with prejudice.
Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices. The Court dismissed this claim with prejudice, finding that Defendant’s non-conclusory allegations relating to its unfair and deceptive trade practices claim were sparse and Defendant failed to allege any aggravating circumstances that would support raising a mere breach of contract claim to the level of unfair and deceptive trade practices.
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DT Lulana Gardens LLC v. SDCK I LLC, 2026 NCBC 43 (N.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 28, 2026) (Davis, J.)
Key Terms: Rule 12(b)(1); Rule 12(b)(6); motion to dismiss; breach of contract; choice of law; standing; economic duress; implied partnership/joint venture; breach of partnership by estoppel; fiduciary duties; unjust enrichment; fraudulent misrepresentation; civil conspiracy
This matter involves a complex set of real estate transactions in Hawaii (“Project”) between Plaintiffs (comprising BMB Investments, LLC and its subsidiaries, including DT Lulana Gardens LLC (“DTLG”), the special purpose vehicle formed for the Project), Defendants Jasper Lake, LLP and Jasper Lake Ventures Two, LLC (ultimately owned by N. Kolatch), and Defendant investor Setanta Development Capital, LLC.
During due diligence, the parties discovered one parcel was subject to two loans, a seller financed loan and a loan with a foreclosure auction scheduled. N. Kolatch and Setanta, through newly formed SDCK I LLC, would purchase the foreclosing loan and sell it to an affiliate of BMB to complete the auction and own the parcel. Certain parties entered into a non-binding Letter of Intent dated April 1, 2022 (“LOI”) stating Setanta would invest $90M, SDCK would facilitate the above stated loan transaction, and BMB would finance the balance and develop the Project. SDCK and DTLG entered into a purchase agreement (“PSA”) for the loan purchase, and a Pledge Agreement where the equity interest in a BMB subsidiary (the “Pledged Equity”) was pledged to SDCK for the purchase price under the PSA. After purchasing the loan, SDCK postponed the auction indefinitely and DTLG did not fund the purchase price. On December 13, 2023, SDCK unilaterally terminated the PSA. On January 17, 2024, SDCK rescheduled the auction and purchased the subject parcel. In late 2024, the holder of the seller financed loan foreclosed on its interest to the property. Thereafter, SDCK sent to DTLG a demand for $12,324,198.15 (the “Payoff Amount”) under the PSA and notice of its exercise upon the Pledged Equity. Plaintiffs filed for a temporary restraining order, which was denied. Plaintiffs delivered the Payoff Amount to SDCK. Plaintiffs then initiated this suit, which Defendants moved to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).
Choice of Law. Based on a choice of law provision in the PSA, the parties agreed that New York applied to the breach of contract claim. Although the limited record did not adequately determine if there was a substantial relationship to New York, the Court agreed to apply New York law until the record was more fully developed.
Standing. Each Plaintiff contended, and the Court agreed, that Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged some injury tied to Defendant’s conduct, particularly, (1) DTLG was a party to the PSA which SDCK breached, (2) BOMA was a party to Pledge Agreement and was forced to pay the Payoff Amount, (3) BOMA NC was the subject of the threatened UCC foreclosure sale, and (4) BMB and Snake River were signatories to the LOI. Accordingly, the Court denied Defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of standing.
Breach of Contract. Because only DTLG and SDCK were parties to the PSA, the Court only analyzed the breach of contract claim with respect to such parties. SDCK argued that DTLG failed to pay the purchase price by the closing date, and SDCK was entitled to seek all remedies, including foreclosing on the BOMA NC equity interest. Plaintiffs argued that (i) SDCK’s decision to postpone the auction undermined the purpose of the PSA, (ii) SDCK did not demand the purchase price when it rescheduled and performed the auction, and (iii) SDCK thereafter unilaterally terminated the PSA. The Court found that these allegations were sufficient to allege a breach of contract under NY law as between DTLG and SDCK, but otherwise dismissed the claim as to all other parties.
Economic Duress. Plaintiffs’ claim for economic duress was based on allegations that although the Payoff Amount was grossly excessive, they paid it because they felt they lacked any alternative given the risk of losing BOMA’s ownership interest in BOMA NC. The Court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss because (i) the economic power SDCK wielded over DTLG and BOMA was derived from the PSA and Pledge Agreement, (ii) Plaintiffs did not lack a remedy as they previously sought a temporary restraining order, which was denied, and (iii) the threat of the UCC sale was not a surprise as SDCK had reserved all rights and remedies in the termination notice.
Breach of Implied Partnership Agreement/Joint Venture Agreement. Plaintiffs argued an implied partnership and/or joint venture was formed because the LOI contemplated the formation of a joint venture and the parties represented to third parties that Plaintiffs, Defendants, and their principals were all one and the same, each with the authorization to bind SDCK, and even shared legal counsel. The Court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss because (i) the PSA expressly provided it did not create a partnership or joint venture, (ii) the LOI was non-binding, (iii) there were no assertions of co-ownership of the subject property, and (iv) the assertions the parties agreed to share in profits and equally control the project were too conclusory or vague.
Breach of Partnership Agreement by Estoppel. Plaintiffs argued that a partnership was formed because they relied to their detriment on the Defendants’ representations to third parties that a partnership existed. The Court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss because a claim for partnership by estoppel only applies to claims brought by third parties against an alleged partnership, not by parties to the alleged partnership.
Breach of Fiduciary Duty. Because Plaintiffs’ claim for breach of fiduciary duty was based on a de jure fiduciary duty arising from a partnership or joint venture, and the Court had already determined that neither a partnership nor a joint venture existed, the Court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss.
Unjust Enrichment. Plaintiffs argued Defendants were unjustly enriched because Plaintiffs were forced to pay the Payoff Amount and because Plaintiffs contributed significant sums in furtherance of the Project which Defendants were now independently resuming. The Court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss because (i) the Payoff Amount was governed by contract and (ii) there were no non-conclusory allegations that the parties understood Plaintiffs would be repaid for any money, time or resources contributed to the Project.
Fraudulent Misrepresentation and Omission. Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants made misrepresentations regarding the process of acquiring and financing the Project, that all parties were one and the same, and that the parties would share in all profits and losses. The Court found that these allegations were insufficient to meet the heightened pleading standard because they did not identify the time and place of the misrepresentation, the specific misrepresentations made, or the person(s) who made them. Therefore, the Court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss.
Civil Conspiracy. Because Plaintiffs’ conspiracy claim depended on their tort claims which were dismissed by the Court, the Court dismissed the conspiracy claim as well.
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Law Off. of Ashley-Nicole Russell, P.A. v. McLawhorn Legal Servs. PLLC, 2026 NCBC 44 (N.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 29, 2026) (Robinson, C.J.)
Key Terms: motion to dismiss appeal; attorneys’ fee; Rules 25(a) and 3(a) N.C. R. App. Proc.; Business Court Rule 3.11; N.C.G.S. § 7A-27(a)
Following the Court’s entry of an order dismissing all claims against Defendants, Plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal on the Business Court’s filing system and addressed it to the North Carolina Court of Appeals. Thereafter, Defendants moved to dismiss the notice of appeal and requested attorneys’ fees.
The Court noted that (i) under Appellate Rule 25(a), it retains jurisdiction to determine whether a notice of appeal was timely and properly filed until the appeal is docketed, (ii) under Appellate Rule 3(a), the notice of appeal must be filed with the clerk of superior court, who, pursuant to BCR 3.11, maintains the official file for any action designated to the Business Court, and (iii) under N.C.G.S. § 7A-27(a), any appeal from the Court must be taken to the Supreme Court of North Carolina. Because the time to properly file the notice of appeal had expired and Plaintiffs had not filed the notice of appeal with the clerk of superior court and did not address the notice of appeal to the North Carolina Supreme Court, the Court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss the appeal. With respect to Defendants’ attorneys’ fees request, the Court ordered Defendants to file a separate motion with supporting brief and affidavits.
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Bronson v. Burnham, 2026 NCBC 45 (N.C. Super. C. Apr. 29, 2026) (Davis, J.)
Key Terms: summary judgment; derivative action; fiduciary duty; business judgment rule; self-dealing; constructive fraud; judicial dissolution; N.C.G.S. § 57D-6-02
As summarized here, this case involves a dispute between the members of two related companies, Lafayette Village Pub, LLC and Executive Suites at Lafayette Village, LLC. Two of the members brought suit against the third member, asserting various derivative and individual claims arising from Defendant’s alleged financial mismanagement and self-dealing. Following the dismissal of all the direct claims and the close of discovery, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the derivative claims for breach of fiduciary duties, constructive fraud, and judicial dissolution.
Pub’s Claims.
Breach of Fiduciary Duty. Because evidence in the record reflected that (i) Defendant participated in self-dealing by making multiple loans to himself, his spouse, and affiliated companies, (ii) Defendant could not recall or explain a myriad of significant receipts or disbursements of the Pub, and (iii) Defendant directed that Pub property be shipped to Defendant’s residence, in the latter case without compensation to the Pub, and in each case without the consent of the other managers, the Court concluded that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether Defendant breached his fiduciary duty to the Pub. Defendant argued his actions were protected by the business judgment rule; however, the Court determined that Defendant was not entitled to summary judgment on that basis because the business judgment rule does not apply to conflicted transactions or self-dealing, such as that evidenced here. Defendant also argued that Plaintiff could not prove actual damages resulted from Defendant’s actions; however, since nominal damages are available for breach of fiduciary duty claims, the lack of actual damages is not a basis for summary judgment. Accordingly, the Court denied the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment as to the Pub.
Constructive Fraud. Plaintiffs’ constructive fraud claim was based on the same conduct as the breach of fiduciary duty claim. The Court found that there were general issues of material fact on whether Defendant had conferred a benefit on himself and whether the transactions between him and the Pub were fair. Thus, it denied the motions on this claim.
Judicial Dissolution. Because the Pub had already been administratively dissolved, all that remained was the “winding up” process. Since resolution of the case was necessary to determine if damages shall be paid to the Pub and a question regarding each member’s percentage of ownership interest remained outstanding, the Court deferred ruling on whether to appoint a receiver to supervise the winding up.
Executive Suites’ Claims.
Breach of Fiduciary Duty/Constructive Fraud. Based on evidence that Defendant had directed Executive Suites to make payments to various Defendant-controlled entities, which Defendant could not explain, the Court found that genuine issues of material fact existed and denied the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment on these claims.
Judicial Dissolution. Because the parties’ arguments regarding the necessity of judicial dissolution were intertwined with the same issues as to which the Court had already determined that genuine disputes of material fact exist, the Court deferred ruling on Plaintiffs’ request for judicial dissolution.
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State of N.C. v. MV Realty PBC, LLC, 2026 NCBC Order 41 (N.C. Super Ct. Apr. 23, 2026) (Davis, J.)
Key Terms: consent judgment; unfair and deceptive practices; unfair debt collection practices; usury; North Carolina Telephone Solicitation Act; injunction; real property; homeowner benefit agreement; monetary judgment
As previously summarized here, the NC Attorney General brought this action alleging that Defendants engaged in unfair or deceptive trade practices and other violations of North Carolina law through their enterprise in which they persuaded homeowners to sign “Homeowner Benefit Agreements” obligating them to use defendants’ agents as their exclusive real estate brokers if they sold their homes in the next forty years and authorizing monetary penalties for breach of the HBAs. In January 2026, the Court granted partial summary judgment in favor of the State on all claims but deferred entering any order related to monetary damages. The parties agreed to enter into a consent judgment, pursuant to which Defendants agreed to, inter alia, not attempt to collect any fees relating to the HBAs, dismiss any pending litigation against consumers relating to the HBAs, record terminations of any memorandum relating to the HBAs, and cease doing business in North Carolina. Further, Defendants agreed to judgment against them in the amount of $4.5 million, with $1.32 million to be paid by December 31, 2026, with the remaining amount of the judgment suspended if Defendants fully comply with the consent judgment. The Court entered the consent judgment as the final judgment in the matter.
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Charles Schwab & Co. v. Marilley, 2026 NCBC Order 42 (N.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 24, 2026) (Earp, J.)
Key Terms: motion to stay or suspend; interpleader; N.C. R. Civ. P. 22; declaratory judgment; N.C. R. Civ. P. 62(c)
As summarized here, this dispute originally arose between L. Marilley and her father, P. Marilley, over assets restrained in a Charles Schwab & Co.’s (Schwab) brokerage account owned by L. Marilley. Schwab filed an interpleader action to adjudicate the claims between the Marilleys. After the Court granted summary judgment in favor of L. Marilley and ordered Schwab to disburse the funds to her, P. Marilley appealed to the North Carolina Supreme Court, and, shortly thereafter, Schwab and P. Marilley each filed a motion to stay or suspend any enforcement or execution of the order, specifically the portion of the order mandating the disbursement of the funds immediately to L. Marilley.
Rule 62(c) authorizes the Court, in its discretion, to modify or stay a mandatory injunction during an appeal. However, the burden is on the movant to show why such relief should be granted. Neither movant met this burden. P. Marilley’s supposition that L. Marilley would liquidate and spend the funds was not sufficient to show prejudice or irreparable harm and Schwab did not adequately explain how compliance with the order would adversely affect it. Accordingly, the Court denied the motion.
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Gray Constr., Inc. v. Future Meat Techs., Inc., 2026 NCBC Order 43 (N.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 27, 2026) (Davis, J.)
Key Terms: N.C.G.S. § 1-507.42(c) and (d); receivership; automatic stay
On December 31, 2025, an order was entered for a limited receivership for the Debtor’s property securing the obligations of Plaintiff and Ameris Bank, which converted to a general receivership by order dated February 6, 2026. The receiver then requested, under N.C.G.S. 1-507.42(c) and (d), an extension of the additional automatic stay against the commencement or continuation of any judicial action against the Debtor for a period of six months to provide the receiver with sufficient time to market and sell the Debtor’s business as a going concern without undue interference and collateral litigation. Because the extension request was timely filed and no party objected, the Court granted the receiver’s motion.
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Davis v. HCA Healthcare, Inc., 2026 NCBC Order 44 (N.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 30, 2026) (Davis, J.)
Key Terms: N.C. R. Civ. P. Rule 52(a)(2); motions to seal; trade secrets; referee
This case involves a class action lawsuit by North Carolina residents alleging that certain Defendants, and their predecessors, engaged in anticompetitive acts. In connection with various substantive motions, Plaintiffs, Defendants, and certain non-parties sought to seal all, or some portion of, 312 different documents comprising thousands of pages. At the direction of the Court, the parties later submitted a joint status report detailing their efforts to limit their sealing requests and an index of proposed redactions. Given that the motions to seal involved a large number of managed care contracts with insurance providers that required a highly fact-specific analysis to determine whether such documents were competitively valuable or constituted protectable trade secrets information, the Court, under N.C. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(2), directed that the existing motions to seal – and future sealing issues – be first referred to a referee for the generation of a report and recommendations to be submitted to the Court.
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Diskin v. Shelley, 2026 NCBC Order 45 (N.C. Super. Ct. May 4, 2026) (Robinson, C.J.)
Key Terms: notice of designation; N.C.G.S. § 7A-45.4(a)(1); limited liability company; pledge agreement; UCC Article 9; contract law principles
Plaintiff initiated suit against Defendants, asserting claims for breach of a promissory note, constructive trust, accounting, equitable turnover, injunctive relief, and judicial enforcement of a pledge agreement. Defendants timely filed their Notice of Designation, seeking designation as a mandatory complex business case under N.C.G.S. § 7A-45.4(a)(1). Defendants argued that the enforcement of the pledge agreement, including a determination as to whether Plaintiff was entitled to exercise the pledged voting and management rights upon Defendant Shelley’s default on the promissory note, implicated the law governing limited liability companies. Defendants also contended that certain issues arising out of Article 9 of the UCC implicated Chapter 57D. The Court determined that the case was not properly designated as a mandatory complex business case pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-45.4(a)(1) because the matter did not implicate the law governing limited liability companies and only required the application of contract law principles.
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