N.C. Business Court Opinions, May 6, 2026 – May 19, 2026
By: Lauren Schantz and Ashley Oldfield
Best Logistics Grp., Inc. v. Bravo, 2026 NCBC 46 (N.C. Super. Ct. May 8, 2026) (Conrad, J.)
Key Terms: motion to dismiss; Rule 12(b)(6); BCR 7.4; breach of employment agreement; solicitation of employees; conclusory; solicitation of customers; overbroad; tortious interference with contract; tortious interference with prospective contract; N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1; misappropriation of trade secrets; injunctive relief; remedy
Defendants Bravo and Carson, former employees of Plaintiffs, resigned to join a competitor. Plaintiffs alleged Defendants misappropriated Plaintiffs’ trade secrets and confidential information and that Defendants’ new employer was using the information to compete with Plaintiffs. Defendants moved to dismiss five of the claims asserted against them. The Court elected not to hold a hearing pursuant to BCR 7.4.
Breach of Contract: Solicitation of Employees. Plaintiffs alleged that Bravo breached the employee non-solicitation provision in his employment agreement. The Court concluded that the amended complaint did not contain any allegations that Bravo solicited employees or that Carson’s actions were attributable to Bravo. The Court determined that the remaining allegations were conclusory and dismissed the claim as to Bravo (with prejudice because Plaintiffs had already amended the complaint).
Breach of Contract: Solicitation of Customers. Plaintiffs alleged that Bravo breached the customer non-solicitation provision in his employment agreement. Bravo moved to dismiss the claim, contending that the provision was overbroad and unenforceable. The Court denied the motion as to this claim, noting that this argument was better suited for summary judgment.
Tortious Interference. The Court concluded that Plaintiffs failed to allege that any customer failed to perform a current contract or that they lost a potential contract due to Defendants’ interference. The Court dismissed these claims with prejudice.
N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1. Defendants sought dismissal of the claim except to the extent that it was based on Plaintiffs’ misappropriation of trade secrets allegations. Because the Court had dismissed all but one of the underlying claims, the Court dismissed the claim except to the extent that it was based on Defendants’ alleged misappropriation of trade secrets and Bravo’s alleged breach of the customer non-solicitation clause of his employment agreement.
Injunctive Relief. The Court dismissed this claim without prejudice because it is a remedy, not an independent cause of action.
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Kadah v. Paladin Drones, Inc., 2026 NCBC 47 (N.C. Super. Ct. May 11, 2026 (Houston, J.)
Key Terms: Rule 12(b)(6); breach of contract; notice pleading; N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1; unfair or deceptive trade practices; employer-employee dispute; aggravating circumstances
Plaintiff filed suit against his former employer, asserting various claims arising from Defendant’s alleged breach of the parties’ oral agreement, under which Defendant was to pay Plaintiff a $250,000 bonus and additional compensation and “re-up” Plaintiff’s equity. Defendant moved to dismiss two of the claims under Rule 12(b)(6).
Breach of Contract. The Court denied the motion as to claim for breach of the oral agreement. Plaintiff had identified the material terms of the agreement and alleged Defendant’s breach thereof. That the parties contemplated later memorializing the terms of the oral agreement in writing did not establish that there was no oral agreement. Further, the complaint did not affirmatively establish that Plaintiff had himself breached a material term of the agreement.
Unfair or Deceptive Trade Practices. Plaintiff’s UDTPA claim was based on his breach of contract claims. The Court dismissed the claim because the alleged conduct related solely to the internal conduct of a single business and therefore wasn’t in or affecting commerce. In addition, Plaintiff did not identify the substantial aggravating circumstances necessary to elevate a breach of contract to an unfair or deceptive trade practice.
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Davis v. HCA Healthcare, Inc., 2026 NCBC Order 46 (N.C. Super. Ct. May 6, 2026) (Davis, J.)
Key Terms: surreply; BCR 7.7
Plaintiffs filed a motion requesting to be granted leave to file a surreply in connection with Defendants’ motion to exclude the witness’s expert report, in order to apprise the Court of Defendants’ purported mischaracterization of Plaintiffs’ argument. The Court denied the motion determining that a surreply would be neither helpful nor appropriate under the circumstances. The Court distinguished the present request from its previous grant of leave to file a surreply where the reply had raised a new issue.
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Barings LLC v. Fowler, 2026 NCBC Order 47 (N.C. Super. Ct. May 11, 2026) (Conrad, J.)
Key Terms: briefing word limits; summary judgment; statement of facts; BCR 7.8
Without permission from or request by the Court, and in connection with Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, both parties submitted extensive statements of facts separate from their briefing. The Court determined that these submissions were in violation of BCR 7.8, which limits briefs in support of a motion for summary judgment to 7,500 words. In its discretion, the Court directed the parties to file revised briefs in compliance with BCR 7.8.
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NC Moulding Acquisition, LLC v. Smith, 2026 NCBC Order 48 (N.C. Super. Ct. May 11, 2026) (Robinson, C.J.)
Key Terms: order on designation; second notice of designation; amended complaint; N.C.G.S. § 7A-45.4(a)(1); N.C.G.S. § 7A-45.4(a)(2); securities
Plaintiffs filed suit asserting claims for unjust enrichment and declaratory judgment and timely filed a notice of designation seeking designation under N.C.G.S. § 7A-45.4(a)(1). Plaintiffs asserted that subsection (a)(1) was implicated because the DJ claim requested interpretation of the Plaintiff LLC’s operating agreement and a determination of the ownership of an interest in the LLC. In a previous order, summarized here, the Court concluded that designation was not proper because interpretation of the operating agreement required only a straightforward application of contract law principles and did not implicate the law governing LLCs.
Thereafter, Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint alleging the same facts and claims but adding a sentence that the ownership interest at issue “constitutes a security under North Carolina law.” Plaintiffs contemporaneously filed a second NOD, seeking designation under N.C.G.S. § 7A-45.4(a)(2)—disputes involving securities. Defendant filed a notice of consent to designation. The Court determined that designation was not proper. Where the claims are effectively the same in both the complaint and the amended complaint, designation must be based on the complaint to be considered timely. Thus, because the claims were the same in both pleadings, Plaintiffs should have raised designation under subsection (a)(2) in their first NOD. The Court declined to address whether the claims would have supported designation under subsection (a)(2). In addition, the Court also noted that neither subsection (a)(1) or (a)(2) provide a mechanism to consent to designation.
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Charles Schwab & Co. v. Marilley, 2026 NCBC Order 49 (N.C. Super Ct. May 11, 2026) (Earp, J.)
Key Terms: attorneys’ fees; Rule 11; N.C.G.S. § 6-21.5; bill of costs; duplicate time entries; redactions; appeal; jurisdiction; hourly rate; appeal; stay; reasonableness; N.C. R. Prof. Conduct 1.5; N.C.G.S. § 6-20; N.C.G.S. § 7A-305
As previously summarized here, this dispute originally arose between L. Marilley and her father, P. Marilley, over assets restrained in a Charles Schwab & Co. (Schwab) brokerage account owned by L. Marilley. Schwab filed an interpleader action to adjudicate the claims between the Marilleys. After the Court granted summary judgment in favor of L. Marilley, the Court determined that L. Marilley was entitled to attorneys’ fees under both Rule 11 and N.C.G.S. § 6-21.5. M. Marilley appealed both orders.
L. Marilley submitted her petition for attorneys’ fees and a motion for a bill of costs. She subsequently moved for leave to supplement her original petition to include fees incurred to litigate whether the Court should stay any part of its summary judgment order pending appeal. At the hearing, the Court directed L. Marilley to resubmit invoices that eliminated duplicate time entries and reduced redactions. L. Marrilley resubmitted her invoices and M. Marilley objected to the inclusion of a new invoice, which the Court declined to consider.
The Court first determined that M. Marilley’s appeal of the sanctions order did not divest the Court of jurisdiction to rule on L. Marilley’s petition and motions because an order awarding attorneys’ fees as “judicial discipline” is non-appealable unless it sets the amount of fees.
The Court concluded that, under Rule 11, L. Marilley was entitled to attorneys’ fees incurred after M. Marilley filed his answer to the amended crossclaim, including fees incurred for litigating the motion to stay pending appeal and for preparing her petition for fees. The Court determined that the rates charged and time expended by L. Marilley’s counsel and staff were reasonable and awarded L. Marilley the full amount requested in her petition. The Court also awarded L. Marilley the full amount requested in her petition pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 6-21.5, but noted that amount was subsumed in the Rule 11 award. The Court granted L. Marilley’s motion for costs and ordered M. Marilley to reimburse her for the cost of mediation and service by certified mail.
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Smith v. Chastain, 2026 NCBC Order 50 (N.C. Super. Ct. May 18, 2026) (Robinson, C.J.)
Key Terms: order on designation; notice of designation; inadequate explanation for designation; amount in controversy; N.C.G.S. § 7A-45.4(a)(1); N.C.G.S. § 7A-45.4(b)(2)
Plaintiff filed suit alleging various claims arising from a dispute between two business owners and contemporaneously filed a notice of designation. On the NOD, Plaintiff checked the box for designation under N.C.G.S. § 7A-45.4(a)(1) and (b)(2), but did not provide any basis or explanation for designation. In addition, the complaint did not state an amount in controversy equal to or exceeding $5 million, which is required for designation under subsection (b)(2). Because Plaintiff failed to explain why the case should be designated as a mandatory business case and did not allege the requisite amount in controversy, the Court determined that the case was not properly designated under either subsection (a)(1) or (b)(2).
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The information in this article is not, nor is it intended to be, legal advice. You should consult an attorney for advice regarding your individual situation.