N.C. Business Court Opinions, May 20, 2026 – June 2, 2026
By: Romney Harris, Amanda Reader, and Ashley Oldfield
Wright v. LoRusso, 2026 NCBC 48 (N.C. Super. Ct. May 21, 2026) (Conrad, J.)
Key Terms: notice of appeal; N.C. R. App. P. (3)(a), (c)(1); time for taking Appeal; N.C.G.S. § 7A-27(a)
As summarized here, the Court previously entered a final judgment in this case and awarded damages to Defendant. Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, subsequently filed a notice of appeal through the Court’s e-filing system giving notice of appeal to the North Carolina Court of Appeals. The Court dismissed the appeal because 1) Plaintiff did not file his notice of appeal with the clerk of superior court as required by Appellate Rule 3 and the time to do so had expired; and 2) Plaintiff appealed to the wrong court since N.C.G.S. § 7A-27(a) requires that an appeal in a case designated as a mandatory complex business case shall be taken to the North Carolina Supreme Court.
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Overton Row Holdings, LLC v. CW Constr. & Dev., LLC, 2026 NCBC 49 (N.C. Super. Ct. June 2, 2026) (Houston, J.)
Key Terms: motion for summary judgment; motion to accept late filing; case management order; dual filing on Odyssey and Alpine; BCR 7.1; BCR 7.10
The parties’ deadline to file any dispositive motions was 21 May 2026. At approximately 5:30pm on that date, Defendant AGA Stucco filed its motion for summary judgment, brief, and supporting exhibits with the clerk of superior court via Odyssey. Six days later, AGA Stucco filed its motion for summary judgment, a brief, and certain supporting exhibits with the Business Court via Alpine; however, the brief filed was not the correct brief. The following day, AGA Stucco filed a motion requesting that the Court accept its motion for summary judgment and related filings as timely filed.
In its discretion, and pursuant to BCR 7.1(c) and 7.10, the Court denied the motion for summary judgment because it was not timely filed on Alpine (or even on Odyssey) and the correct supporting brief had yet to be filed on Alpine. The Court also denied the motion to accept the late filings because AGA Stucco did not provide any valid basis for the requested relief.
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Kadah v. Paladin Drones, Inc., 2026 NCBC 50 (N.C. Super. Ct. June 2, 2026) (Houston, J.)
Key Terms: emergency response drones; Rule 12(b)(6); breach of contract; misappropriation of trade secrets; defamation; tortious interference with prospective economic advantage
This action involves a dispute between Kadah and his former employer, Paladin Drones, Inc. Kadah moved under Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss the counterclaims asserted against him by Paladin.
Breach of Contract. Paladin alleged that Kadah breached his employment agreement by 1) sharing confidential information with third parties in violation of the non-disclosure provisions of the agreement; and 2) deleting information from his company computer. The Court found these allegations sufficient to state a claim under notice pleading. Paladin also alleged that Kadah breached his non-compete agreement, which prohibited Kadah from competing nationwide for one year, including by participating in any activity where he contributes his knowledge “directly or indirectly” to a competitor in the public safety sector. The Court concluded that, under governing Texas law, these restrictions were unreasonable as a matter of law. Accordingly, the Court dismissed the claim for breach of the non-compete agreement.
Misappropriation of Trade Secrets. Paladin alleged misappropriation of trade secrets based on six categories of information. The Court dismissed the claim with respect to Paladin’s prospective customer list, its investor list, and the identities of the partners on its partner list because Paladin failed to plead facts suggesting that this information was not readily available through independent development. However, the claim otherwise survived because Paladin had adequately pleaded 1) trade secrets with respect to its customer list, the pricing information on its partner list, its go-to-market strategy, and its technology strategy; and 2) acts of misappropriation based on Kadah’s access to the information, his sharing it with third parties, and his retention of it after his employment ended.
Tortious Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage. Paladin alleged that 1) Kadah interfered with its prospective economic opportunities with three specific entities by making misrepresentations to them and disclosing Paladin’s alleged trade secrets, all in an effort to undercut those entities’ potential investments in Paladin; 2) that Kadah did so with the specific intent of harming Paladin and to benefit himself; and 3) that Kadah’s actions did, in fact, interfere with these opportunities. The Court found that these allegations were sufficient to state a claim.
Defamation. Paladin alleged that Kadah made defamatory statements to specific third parties in which he “alleged, in substance, that Paladin was being financially mismanaged and that its CEO was not competent.” The Court dismissed the claim because this “high-level paraphrase” of Kadah’s statements lacked the requisite particularity to state a claim.
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SCOR Glob. Life Ams. Reinsurance Co. v. Brighthouse Life Ins. Co., 2026 NCBC Order 51(N.C. Super Ct. May 20, 2026) (Davis, J.)
Key Terms: arbitration agreement; petition to enforce arbitration agreement; declaratory judgment; umpire selection process; candidate nomination; common candidate; contract interpretation; plain language; agreed method; arbitrator appointment; N.C.G.S. § 1-569.11(a); Federal Arbitration Act; North Carolina Revised Uniform Arbitration Act; retention of jurisdiction
Insurer Brighthouse and reinsurer SCOR entered into yearly agreements governing their business relationship. After a dispute arose regarding their rights and obligations under a spring 2025 contract, the parties executed an arbitration agreement to resolve it. The agreement provided for a three-member arbitration panel, with each side selecting one arbitrator and the third arbitrator, or umpire, to be selected through a ranking process in which each party nominated six different candidates. After exchanging candidate lists, the parties discovered that one nominee appeared on both lists. SCOR petitioned to enforce the arbitration agreement, while Brighthouse sought a declaratory judgment that the agreement required twelve distinct candidates and that the agreed selection procedure therefore could not proceed.
The Court rejected Brighthouse’s interpretation of the arbitration agreement. The Court concluded that the agreement required each party to nominate six different candidates on its own list, but did not require the combined pool to consist of twelve different individuals. Because the agreement used the word “different” only to describe each party’s six nominees, the Court determined that Brighthouse’s proposed reading would add language the parties did not include.
The Court further concluded that ordinary North Carolina contract-construction principles did not permit it to rewrite the parties’ agreement to address the shared-candidate issue. In the Court’s view, if the parties intended to require twelve unique candidates or to adopt a special procedure for handling a common nominee, they could have included such language in the agreement.
The Court also rejected Brighthouse’s argument that SCOR’s interpretation produced an absurd result. The Court determined that there was nothing unreasonable about allowing a common candidate to remain in the selection process where both parties had independently identified that person as fair and qualified. Accordingly, the Court directed the parties to continue the umpire-selection process under the agreement, with the shared nominee remaining on both lists, and retained jurisdiction.
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Davis v. HCA Healthcare, Inc., 2026 NCBC Order 52 (N.C. Super Ct. May 21, 2026) (Davis, J.)
Key Terms: Rule 53; referee; motions to seal; sealing procedure; BCR 5.2; public access to records; findings of fact and conclusions of law; objections to referee’s orders; waiver; protective order; confidential information; ex parte communications; judicial discretion; Chapter 75
Plaintiffs brought this putative class action, alleging that Defendants’ ownership and operation of health care facilities in and near Asheville, North Carolina, violated Chapter 75 through anticompetitive conduct in the provision of inpatient and outpatient services. After the parties filed numerous motions to seal, the Court determined that the motions should be referred to a referee under Rule 53. When the parties could not agree on a referee, the Court appointed one with the authority to resolve all pending and future motions to seal, oversee compliance with the Court’s sealing orders, and handle related matters as directed by the Court. The Court set forth the referee’s role, the procedures to be followed for the referee to enter orders and for the parties to object to said orders, and the referee’s compensation.
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Shively v. ACI Learning Holdings, LLC, 2026 N.C. LEXIS 486, 2026 WL 1459065 (May 22, 2026) (per curiam)
Key Terms: affirmed; personal jurisdiction; interlocutory appeal
As summarized here, the Business Court denied Defendants’ motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, per curiam.
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Relation Ins., Inc. v. Pilot Risk Mgmt. Consulting, LLC, 2026 N.C. LEXIS 493, 2026 WL 1459402 (May 22, 2026) (Barringer, J.)
Key Terms: reversed; summary judgment; trade secret misappropriation, nonsolicitation agreement; unjust enrichment; computer trespass; Computer Fraud and Abuse Act; spoliation of evidence; adverse inverse
Plaintiff Relation Insurance sued a group of its Former Employees and their new employer, Pilot Risk, contending that they unlawfully used Relation’s confidential information and trade secrets to solicit employees and clients for Pilot Risk’s benefit. As summarized here, the Business Court previously granted partial summary judgment in favor of Defendants on Plaintiffs’ claims for trade secret misappropriation, breach of nonsolicitation agreements, breach of settlement agreement, unjust enrichment, and violation of the federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. Plaintiffs appealed.
The Supreme Court affirmed the court’s grant of plaintiffs’ motion for adverse inference based on the Former Employees’ spoliation of evidence, but remanded the issue for the court to clarify, with greater precision, its application of the inference as to each claim.
The Court then reversed the grant of summary judgment on all claims except for the claim for unjust enrichment. The Court affirmed summary judgment in favor of Defendants on Plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment claim but on different grounds. Plaintiffs’ claim was based on the Former Employees taking or wrongfully retaining Relation’s information and giving it to Pilot Risk. Thus, there was no willing transfer—i.e., no conferral of a benefit—and therefore no claim for unjust enrichment.
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Langley v. Autocraft, Inc., 2026 N.C. LEXIS 500, 2026 WL 1459425 (May 22, 2026) (Barringer, J.)
Key Terms: modified and affirmed; illusory consideration; void for indefiniteness; quasi-estoppel; mend the hold doctrine; unjust enrichment
This case involves a dispute over whether Plaintiff was entitled to a 10% ownership interest in Defendant Autocraft, Inc., pursuant to the terms of a written agreement. As summarized here, the Business Court previously granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants on the basis that the consideration for the agreement was illusory. The Supreme Court affirmed the Business Court’s order but on different grounds—summary judgment in favor of Defendants was appropriate because the agreement was void for indefiniteness. The Court also rejected Plaintiff’s arguments based on the doctrines of quasi-estoppel and mend the hold.
The dissent would have remanded the case for evaluation of an unjust enrichment claim.
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The information in this article is not, nor is it intended to be, legal advice. You should consult an attorney for advice regarding your individual situation.