N.C. Business Court Opinions, December 17, 2025 – December 31, 2025

By: Ashley Oldfield

Kayser-Roth Corp. v. Gallotti, 2025 NCBC 76 (N.C. Super. Ct. Dec. 29, 2025) (Robinson, C.J.)

Key Terms: Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss; contract interpretation; ambiguity; damages; fraud; breach of contract; Wage and Hour Act; statute of limitations

This action arose out of Defendant’s employment with, and termination from, Plaintiff. Plaintiff alleged that because it terminated Defendant for cause, it did not owe Defendant certain payments under his employment agreement. Defendant filed counterclaims for breach of contract for Plaintiff’s non-payment of severance, annual bonuses, and deferred compensation; NCWHA violations for such nonpayment; and fraud for Plaintiff’s alleged misrepresentation regarding the terms of the employment agreement which induced Defendant to sign it. Plaintiff moved to dismiss the counterclaims.

Damages. Under Defendant’s employment agreement, Defendant’s “base salary” was to be used to in calculating his bonus and severance payments. Defendant contended that “base salary” referred to his annual salary, while Plaintiff contended “base salary” referred to his monthly salary. Plaintiff argued that the claim should be dismissed or limited to the extent it sought damages beyond a calculation based on monthly salary. Due to various inconsistencies in the employment agreement, the Court determined that the term “base salary” was ambiguous and thus declined to dismiss or limit the claim.

Fraud. Defendant’s fraud claim was based on alleged misrepresentations made in 2018 regarding how his bonus and severance payments would be calculated under the employment agreement. The Court determined that Defendant’s allegations were insufficient to state a fraud claim. That Plaintiff now asserted a different interpretation of the agreement did not mean that Plaintiff’s agent had knowingly made a misrepresentation of existing fact at the time of the negotiations.

Statute of Limitations. Plaintiff asserted that Defendant’s breach of contract claim for the 2021 annual bonus and his NCWHA claim for the 2021 and 2022 annual bonuses were time-barred because they were brought outside their respective statutes of limitations. The parties disputed whether, under the employment agreement, bonuses were payable in the year in which they were earned or payable within 75 days of the close of the fiscal year. The Court concluded that under the NCWHA’s two-year statute of limitations, Defendant’s NCWHA claim for the 2021 annual bonus was barred regardless of which party’s position was correct. However, the Court determined that the employment agreement’s language regarding the payment date was ambiguous and, therefore, denied the motion as to the breach of contract claim for the 2021 bonus and the NCWHA claim for the 2022 bonus.

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Evergreen Builder Sols., LLC v. Taylor, 2025 NCBC 77 (N.C. Super. Ct. Dec. 29, 2025) (Houston, J.)

Key Terms: Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss; breach of contract; non-compete agreement; non-solicit agreement; non-disclosure agreement; conversion; tortious interference with contract; legitimate business purpose; UDTPA; constructive trust; punitive damages

Plaintiff brought suit against two former employees, Taylor and Price, and their new employer (and related persons and entities, collectively the “Integrity Defendants”), asserting various claims relating to Taylor’s and Price’s alleged violations of the restrictive covenants in their employment agreements with Plaintiff. Defendants moved to dismiss most of the claims under Rule 12(b)(6).

Breach of Non-Compete and Non-Solicit Provisions. Although Plaintiff only operated in two cities in North Carolina, the non-compete and non-solicit provisions of Taylor’s and Price’s employment agreements prohibited them from competing “directly or indirectly” in any capacity with Plaintiff across at least a 150-mile radius spanning three states for at least three years. The Court found that these provisions were overbroad and unenforceable as they conceivably encompassed all services and products offered and clients serviced at any time regardless of whether Taylor and Price provided the products or services and regardless of whether Plaintiff provided the products or services while Taylor and Price were employed by Plaintiff. Thus, the breach of contract claim was dismissed to the extent based on the non-compete or non-solicit provisions.

Breach of Non-Disclosure/Confidentiality Provisions. With respect to these provisions, Taylor and Price argued that the claim should be dismissed because the information which Plaintiff alleged had been improperly disclosed was publicly available. However, even if the Court took judicial notice of the websites provided by Taylor and Price in support of this argument, the Court was unable to conclude that all of the information covered by the parties’ agreements was publicly available. As Plaintiff had minimally met the pleading requirements for this claim, the Court denied the motion to dismiss.

Conversion. Plaintiff alleged that Taylor and Price had converted its proprietary information by making copies of it while employed by Plaintiff and then using it without permission. The Court dismissed this claim because Plaintiff did not allege that it had demanded the return of the information or that it had actually been deprived of the information by Taylor’s and Price’s conduct.

Tortious Interference with Contract. Plaintiff alleged that the Integrity Defendants had tortiously interfered with Plaintiff’s agreements with Taylor and Price by inducing them to breach the agreements. The Court determined that, with respect to the non-compete and non-solicit provisions of the agreements, the claim failed because those provisions were unenforceable. With respect to the non-disclosure provisions, the claim failed as well because the complaint failed to factually allege that the Integrity Defendants acted with malice, i.e., without a legitimate business purpose. Moreover, the Court determined that the claim failed to meet the notice pleading standards and requirements because it lumped the six Integrity Defendants together and made only conclusory allegations of alter ego status. Without identifying which Defendant did what, the complaint failed to give sufficient notice of the claim.

Violation of the UDTPA. The Court dismissed the UDTPA claim against the Integrity Defendants because it was based solely on the tortious interference claim which was dismissed. However, the Court declined to dismiss the UDTPA claim against Taylor and Price based on Plaintiff’s existing claim for computer trespass, which defendants had not moved to dismiss and which may form the basis of a UDTPA claim.

Injunctive Relief, Constructive Trust, and Punitive Damages. As these are not standalone causes of action, the Court dismissed them without prejudice to Plaintiff’s ability to seek them as remedies if appropriate.

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Meridian Renewable Energy LLC v. Birch Creek Dev., LLC, 2025 NCBC Order 96 (N.C. Superior Ct. Dec. 29, 2025) (Houston, J.)

Key Terms: breach of contract; declaratory judgment; joint venture; chapter 11 bankruptcy; automatic stay; 11 U.S.C. § 362

Plaintiff Meridian Renewable Energy filed suit against Defendant Birch Creek Development asserting, inter alia, claims for breach of contract and declaratory judgment. Birch Creek responded by filing counterclaims against Meridian and third-party claims against Pine Gate Renewables for declaratory judgment and breach of fiduciary duty. A joint venture between Birch Creek and Pine Gate was also named as a third-party defendant. The dispute centered on a consulting agreement and multiple scopes of work (“SOWs”) between the parties. On November 6, 2025, Pine Gate filed chapter 11 bankruptcy in the Southern District of Texas. The parties agreed that the bankruptcy filing stayed all proceedings against Pine Gate under 11 U.S.C. § 362; Birch Creek, though, argued that the bankruptcy automatic stay should extend to all proceedings in the case, or, in the alternative, that the court should stay all proceedings in the case in its discretion.

The Court determined that the automatic stay did not prevent the ongoing litigation as between Meridian and Birch Creek on the whole. However, because both Meridian and Birch Creek sought declaratory judgments regarding the parties’ rights and interests under the consulting agreement and the SOWs, which would necessarily implicate Pine Gate, the Court determined that the declaratory judgment claims should be denied and dismissed without prejudice since the requested relief would not terminate the controversy between the parties. The remaining claims between Meridian and Birch Creek could proceed.

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Moore v. Brooks, 2025 NCBC Order 97 (N.C. Super. Ct. Dec. 31, 2025) (Houston, J.)

Key Terms: show cause; disqualification

As summarized here, the Court previously issued a show cause order to the law firm representing the Plaintiffs in this case due to their filing several motions on behalf of Defendant Redwood WI Holdings. The order directed the firm to show cause to why it should not be disqualified from representing Plaintiffs or Redwood WI Holdings or both.

After the show cause order was entered, Plaintiffs filed notices of voluntary dismissal without prejudice as to Redwood WI Holdings and several other defendants. The law firm then submitted a responsive brief asserting that Plaintiffs had intended to file suit against Redwood WI Holdings as a nominal defendant and that they did not intend to pursue causes of action against it. Because the law firm was no longer representing adverse parties, the Court in its discretion determined that the firm and its attorneys should not be disqualified as counsel.

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The information in this article is not, nor is it intended to be, legal advice. You should consult an attorney for advice regarding your individual situation.

Posted 12/30/25

N.C. Business Court Opinions, December 3, 2025 – December 16, 2025

By: Austin Webber and Ashley Oldfield

Cherry v. Mauck, 2025 NCBC 74 (N.C. Super. Ct. Dec. 8, 2025) (Conrad, J.)

Key Terms: summary judgment; LLC; contractual dissolution; N.C.G.S. § 57D-6-02(2); judicial dissolution; N.C.G.S. § 57D-6-03(d); breach of contract; declaratory judgment

This case arises out of a management dispute in two family businesses—AJAL and C-Gas. As summarized here, the Court previously entered a preliminary injunction enjoining Defendant (a member and manager of both companies) from making distributions in violation of the companies’ operating agreements. Following entry of the preliminary injunction, Defendant sought dissolution of both companies. Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment on their claims for breach of contract, and Defendant moved for summary judgment relating to dissolution.

Plaintiffs’ Claims for Breach of Contract: Plaintiffs sought summary judgment on their claims that Defendant had breached the companies’ operating agreements by making distributions over Plaintiffs’ objections. As there was no dispute of material fact, the Court found Defendant liable on this claim as a matter of law, awarded nominal damages, and entered a permanent injunction enjoining Defendant from making additional distributions without majority consent. The Court, however, denied Plaintiffs’ request for an order requiring Defendant to pay back the amount of the distributions because 1) they had not been personally harmed by the distributions and had not asserted derivative claims on behalf of the companies; and 2) they had not requested specific performance in their complaint.

Declaratory Judgment/Judicial Dissolution: C-Gas. Defendant sought a declaration that C-Gas was dissolved under the deadlock provision in its operating agreement, which provides that if Plaintiff Jay and Defendant are unable to agree on certain matters, including making capital expenditures or cash distributions, and neither initiates the process to purchase the interest of the other within ten days, then C-Gas shall be dissolved. The Court found that there was no dispute of material fact that the parties’ disagreements triggered the deadlock provision and that no party had timely initiated the buy-out process. Thus, the Court granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on his declaratory-judgment claim that C-Gas was dissolved.

Judicial Dissolution: AJAL. Defendant sought judicial dissolution of AJAL under N.C.G.S. § 57D-6-02(2) and invoked both subsections of that provision—subsection (i), which provides for dissolution when it is not practicable to conduct the company’s business; and subsection (ii), which provides for dissolution to protect the rights and interests of a member. After the summary judgment hearing, Plaintiffs withdrew their opposition to dissolution under subsection (ii) and asserted their intent to buy Defendant’s interest in AJAL for fair value pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 57D-6-03(d). Defendant then asserted that summary judgment should only be granted under subsection (i) (which does not provide for a buy-out). The Court, however, held Defendant to his pleadings and granted Defendant summary judgment on his claim for dissolution under subsection (ii) of N.C.G.S. § 57D-6-02(2). But since Plaintiffs intended to purchase Defendant’s equity interest for fair value as allowed by N.C.G.S. § 57D-6-03(d), the Court did not order AJAL’s dissolution.

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Box Co. of Am. v. Bostick, 2025 NCBC 75 (N.C. Super. Ct. Dec. 15, 2025) (Davis, J.)

Key Terms: motion to dismiss; non-compete; non-solicitation; trade secrets; implied contract; quantum meruit; misappropriation of trade secrets; fraud; Rule 9(b); unfair and deceptive trade practices

Defendant Bostick was originally hired by CorTek, Inc. and signed a non-competition agreement prohibiting Bostick from working for a competitor for a two-year period following termination. CorTek later sold its assets to Plaintiff Box Company of America, LLC and assigned Bostick’s non-competition agreement to Plaintiff. Bostick worked for Plaintiff as a key sales employee for about a year before resigning and obtaining new employment with a competitor. After Plaintiff became aware of Bostick soliciting customers with whom he had working during his employment with Plaintiff, Plaintiff filed suit asserting various claims arising from Bostick’s alleged breach of the non-competition agreement and misappropriation of trade secrets. Bostick moved to dismiss all claims.

Breach of Contract: Non-Competition Agreement.  The Court concluded that the non-competition agreement was unenforceable because it prohibited activity in a particular industry in any capacity. The Court declined to consider parol evidence of the parties’ intent because the contract language was not ambiguous or to “blue-pencil” different terms into the agreement. The Court dismissed this claim with prejudice.

Breach of Contract: Confidentiality Agreement.  The Court dismissed, without prejudice, Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim for keeping Plaintiff’s proprietary information confidential because no written agreement existed and Plaintiff failed to adequately allege the existence of such agreement or its terms.

Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing. Where a claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is part and parcel with a breach of contract claim, they rise or fall together. Since the Court had dismissed the breach of contract claims, it also dismissed without prejudice the breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim.

Breach of Implied Contract. The Court dismissed this claim as the complaint was too vague and failed to adequately allege any implied-in-fact contract or the appropriate elements for quantum meruit.

Misappropriation of Trade Secrets. The Court dismissed this claim because Plaintiff failed to allege what reasonable protections it undertook to protect its trade secrets or how Defendant misappropriated any such trade secret.

Fraud. The Court dismissed Plaintiff’s fraud claim because Plaintiff largely failed to allege when the misrepresentations at issue were specifically made, thereby failing to comply with Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading standard. Further, unfulfilled promises of future intent are typically not actionable on a theory of fraud.

Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices. The Court dismissed this claim because 1) the underlying fraud and trade secret misappropriation claims had been dismissed; and 2) disputes between an employer and employee do not typically give rise to UDTP liability.

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Hubquarter Landing Townhome Owners Assoc., Inc. v. Lake Lyfe Homes, LLC, 2025 NCBC Order 94 (N.C. Super. Ct. Dec. 12, 2025) (Robinson, C.J.)

Key Terms: mandatory complex business case; N.C.G.S. § 7A-45.4(a); notice of designation; timeliness; third-party complaint; N.C.G.S. § 7A-45.4(b)(2); amount in controversy

Plaintiffs initiated this action on July 21, 2025. On September 2, 2025, the superior court stayed all proceedings for sixty days. On December 3, 2025, Defendants filed their Answer & Counterclaim/Third-Party Complaint and a Notice of Designation  contending that designation was proper under N.C.G.S. § 7A-45.4(a)(1), (a)(9), and (b)(2).

The Court determined that, for purposes of designation under N.C.G.S. § 7A-45.4(a)(1) and (a)(9), the NOD was untimely. Where a material issue is raised in both a complaint and a third-party complaint, the NOD’s timeliness will be based off of the complaint, which is the first pleading to raise the claimed basis for designation. Here, the issues raised in the third-party complaint were first raised in the complaint. Thus, because Defendants did not file their NOD within 30 days of service of the complaint, the NOD was untimely.

The Court also determined that designation was not proper under N.C.G.S. § 7A-45.4(b)(2) because neither the complaint nor third-party complaint sought damages equal to or exceeding $5,000,000. Defendants’ reference in the NOD to the five million dollar of the real property at issue did not meet the statutory requirement.

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Forsyth Tucker Sports Constr., LLC v. Tucker, 2025 NCBC Order 95 (N.C. Super. Ct. Dec. 15, 2025) (Robinson, C.J.)

Key Terms: N.C.G.S. § 7A-45.4(a); mandatory complex business case; notice of designation

Plaintiff initiated this action on October 6, 2025. On December 8, 2025, Defendant filed his Answer, Affirmative Defenses, Counterclaim, and Third-Party Claim against Andrew Forsyth, as a third party defendant, and simultaneously filed a notice of designation under N.C.G.S. § 7A-45.4(a)(1). Defendant contended that the third-party claim implicated the law governing LLCs because it involved a dispute regarding Defendant and Forsyth’s ownership interests in a limited liability company for which there was no written operating agreement. The Court agreed but concluded that designation was nonetheless improper because the NOD was untimely since the ownership issue was first raised in the complaint. Thus, the NOD should have been filed within thirty days of service of the complaint, which Defendant failed to do.

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Howard v. IOMAXIS, LLC, No. 134A25, 2025 N.C. LEXIS 1091 (N.C. 2025) (per curiam)

Key Terms: economic interest holder; motion to dismiss; personal jurisdiction; affirmed; per curiam

As summarized here, this action involves a dispute between the Ronald E. Howard Revocable Trust (a purported 51% economic interest holder in IOMAXIS) and the IOMAXIS members regarding the Trust’s right to the economic benefits from its interest. Two of the Defendants moved to dismiss on the basis of lack of personal jurisdiction, asserting that they lacked sufficient minimum contacts with North Carolina to confer personal jurisdiction over them. The Business Court denied the motion and Defendants appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed per curiam.

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Gvest Real Estate, LLC v. JS Real Estate Investments, LLC, No. 308A24, 2025 N.C. LEXIS 1083 (N.C. 2025) (Riggs, J.)

Key Terms: summary judgment; final judgment; limited liability company; operating agreement; transfer of membership interest; waiver; fiduciary duty; minority member oppression

As summarized here, this action involves a dispute between the three members of Yards at NoDa, LLC. Plaintiff, a minority member, sought a declaratory judgment that it was the sole member of the LLC due to the Defendants’ transfer of their membership interests. Plaintiff also asserted claims for breach of fiduciary duty and constructive fraud against the other two members, who collectively owned a majority interest. The Business Court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants on these claims and Plaintiff appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed. With respect to the declaratory judgment claim, the evidence showed that the transfer of Defendants’ membership interests was invalid because it did not comply with the LLC’s operating agreement. As to the fiduciary-duty-based claims, Plaintiff urged the Court to use the present case to extend shareholder oppression claims to LLCs and to minority coalitions to create a fiduciary duty. Although the Court acknowledged that there may be situations where a fiduciary duty arises between members of an LLC (such as where the majority coalition controls the appointment of managers in a manager-managed LLC), such a fiduciary duty did not exist in the present circumstances.

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The information in this article is not, nor is it intended to be, legal advice. You should consult an attorney for advice regarding yo

Posted 12/16/25

N.C. Business Court Opinions, November 19, 2025 – December 2, 2025

By: Lauren Schantz

Estevez v. C&S Com., LLC, 2025 NCBC 73 (N.C. Super. Ct. Nov. 25, 2025) (Houston, J.)

Key Terms: Rule 12(b)(6); breach of fiduciary duty; piercing the corporate veil; limited liability company; majority member; remedy; N.C.G.S. 57D-3-30; mere instrumentality; alter ego; domination; conclusory allegations; operating agreement; waiver; good faith and fair dealing; unconscionability; public policy; freedom of contract

Plaintiffs are two minority members and employees of Defendant C&S Commerce, LLC. Defendant Cameron Clay is the majority member and sole manager of the company. Plaintiffs alleged that after they rejected Clay’s multiple attempts to purchase their membership interests, Clay fired them, refused their request to inspect the company’s books and records, and deemed their membership interests forfeited. Plaintiffs sued C&S and Clay, both individually and in his capacity as manager of C&S. Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ remedy of piercing the corporate veil and their claim for breach of fiduciary duty.

Piercing the Corporate Veil. The Court determined that Defendants’ alleged breach of C&S’s operating agreement, standing alone, was insufficient to invoke this remedy. The Court further concluded that Clay’s majority ownership interest did not necessarily rise to the level of domination needed to support a veil-piercing theory. Because the remainder of Plaintiffs’ complaint merely recited the factors North Carolina courts consider when deciding whether to pierce the corporate veil without alleging any specific facts, the Court granted Defendants’ motion and dismissed Plaintiff’s request to pierce the corporate veil.

Breach of Fiduciary Duty. Clay argued that he did not owe Plaintiffs a fiduciary duty or, if he did, any such fiduciary duties were waived pursuant to the operating agreement. The Court agreed, concluding that C&S’s operating agreement contained an express waiver of any fiduciary duties owed by Clay, either as a manager or a majority member, to Plaintiffs. The Court noted that an alleged breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing sounds in contract, not tort, and cannot serve as the basis for a breach of fiduciary duty claim. The Court determined that Plaintiffs’ argument that such a waiver was unconscionable and unenforceable was without merit given North Carolina’s freedom of contract principles. Thus, the Court dismissed Plaintiffs’ claim for breach of fiduciary duty with prejudice.

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Fulbright v. Asheville Arras Residences, LLC, 2025 NCBC Order 90 (N.C. Super. Ct. Nov. 19, 2025) (Davis, J.)

Key Terms: consent motion; settlement; derivative claims; dismissal; nonprofit corporation; condominium owners association; N.C.G.S. § 55A-7-40(d); adequate notice; best interests

Plaintiffs, owners of residential condominiums, sued several defendants over operational and safety concerns related to elevators in their buildings. Two Plaintiffs asserted a derivative claim on behalf of two condominium owners associations. The parties reached a settlement and moved the Court to approve dismissal of the derivative claim. The Court denied the motion without prejudice, noting that the motion omitted key details regarding the adequacy of the notice of the proposed settlement given to interested persons, whether the associations received any responses to the notice, and why the settlement was in the best interests of the associations.

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Water.io Ltd v. Sealed Air Corp., 2025 NCBC Order 91 (N.C. Super. Ct. Nov. 24, 2025) (Conrad, J.)

Key Terms: motion to amend; breach of contract; case management order; deadline to amend pleadings; Rule 15(a); unreasonable delay; nature of the case; raise the stakes; undue prejudice

Plaintiff initiated suit in July 2024, alleging that Defendant breached a contract for the development and sale of sensors. The case management order set a January 2025 deadline to amend the pleadings and a June 2025 deadline for the close of fact discovery. The Court subsequently granted numerous extensions of case management deadlines, though not the deadline to amend the pleadings, and, as summarized here, granted Defendant’s partial summary judgment motion filed prior to the close of discovery. Weeks before the fact discovery deadline, Plaintiff moved for leave to amend its complaint, adding a new defendant, six new claims for relief, and pages of new factual allegations. The Court denied the motion based on Plaintiff’s unreasonable delay in asserting the new allegations and because the amendments would change the nature of the case and raise the stakes of the lawsuit, thereby unduly prejudicing Defendant.

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Water.io Ltd v. Sealed Air Corp., 2025 NCBC Order 92 (N.C. Super. Ct. Nov. 24, 2025) (Conrad, J.)

Key Terms: discovery dispute; inadvertent production; attorney-client privilege; work-product immunity; claw-back; BCR 10.9; Rule 26(b)(3); waiver; undue hardship; substantial equivalent; timely; subject matter waiver

Plaintiff moved the Court to determine whether two documents inadvertently produced by Defendant in discovery may be clawed back on the basis of attorney-client privilege and/or work-product immunity. The Court concluded that the first document was protected by work-product immunity because Defendant’s in-house counsel requested that the document be created in anticipation of litigation with Plaintiff. The Court disagreed with Plaintiff that Defendant had waived its right to claw back the first document, determining that Defendant’s initial review for privilege was reasonable and its request was timely. The Court further determined that Plaintiff did not face undue hardship in obtaining the substantial equivalent of the first document through other discovery. Although the Court determined that Defendant waived its claw-back rights to the second document based on Defendant’s six-week delay in asserting the attorney-client privilege, the Court concluded that the imposition of a subject matter waiver was improper. The Court denied Plaintiff’s motion as to the first document and granted Plaintiff’s motion as to the second document.

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Dover Sub 1 LLC v. Hawks Note Purchase, LLC, 2025 NCBC Order 93 (N.C. Super. Ct. Nov. 25, 2025) (Robinson, C.J.)

Key Terms: opposition to designation; intervenor; N.C.G.S. § 7A-45.4(b)(2); limited liability company; N.C.G.S. § 7A-45.4(d)(2); timely; pleading; N.C.G.S. § 7A-45.4(a)(1); managerial authority; N.C.G.S. § 57D-3-20; N.C.G.S. § 7A-243; declaratory judgment; value of rights; N.C.G.S. § 7A-45.4(g)

This matter arises from a dispute among several interrelated limited liability companies that were parties to a real estate investment transaction. MaxMez NC, LLC filed a motion to intervene, a proposed intervenor complaint, and, a day later, a notice of designation. Plaintiffs opposed designation, arguing that the notice of designation was untimely, the matter did not involve a dispute involving the law governing limited liability companies, and MaxMez was using the designation process to delay trial.

The Court agreed that the notice of designation was untimely because MaxMez did not file it contemporaneously with its motion to intervene and intervenor complaint. However, the Court nevertheless concluded that the matter must be designated as a mandatory complex business case pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-45.4(b)(2) because (1) the matter involved questions of managerial authority within a complex corporate structure such that the case was properly designated under section 7A-45.4(a)(1); and (2) it included a declaratory judgment claim where the rights at stake were valued at more than $5 million. The Court noted that a pleading need not expressly cite a provision of the North Carolina Limited Liability Company Act to qualify for designation under section 7A-45.4(a)(1), and the Court further determined that MaxMez had not unreasonably delayed in seeking to intervene. The opposition was overruled and the matter remained a mandatory complex business case.

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The information in this article is not, nor is it intended to be, legal advice. You should consult an attorney for advice regarding your individual situation.

Posted 12/02/25